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Abstract
China’s emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world
trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor
markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are
substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in
the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated.
Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation
rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade
after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and
reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more
exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries
have yet to materialize. Better understanding when and where trade is costly, and how and why
it may be beneficial, are key items on the research agenda for trade and labor economists.
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1 Introduction
Mainstream economists have long argued that international trade improves welfare. While trade
may redistribute income, theory assures us that under standard conditions the gains to winners
are more than sufficient to offset any losses incurred by those suffering adverse effects from foreign
competition. Belief in the Pareto-improving nature of trade made economists front-line advocates
for the broad-based liberalization of commerce that was embedded in the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs and other institutions built to manage the global economy after World War II
(Bhagwati, 1989). Paul Krugman states this view vividly in his 1997 Journal of Economic Literature
article, “If economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a World Trade Organization. The
economist’s case for free trade is essentially a unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by
pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do.”
Of course, introductory trade theory also teaches us that international trade is not generally
Pareto improving. In their undergraduate textbook, Krugman and Obstfeld (2005, p64) write,
“Owners of a country’s abundant factors gain from trade, but owners of a country’s scarce factors
lose... [C]ompared with the rest of the world the United States is abundantly endowed with highly
skilled labor and (...) low-skilled labor is correspondingly scarce. This means that international
trade tends to make low-skilled workers in the United States worse off—not just temporarily, but
on a sustained basis.” For the first three or four decades of the Bretton Woods era, however, there
was little occasion to scrutinize the benefits of trade. Most goods flows were North-North—between
nations with relatively similar average incomes—which helped subdue distributional impacts.
Views on how trade affects wages and employment turned less sanguine in the 1990s. As wage in-
equality rose, low-skill wages and employment fell, and manufacturing employment contracted in the
U.S., globalization was seen initially as a prime suspect. Yet, after vigorous inquiry, concern about
the labor-market consequences of trade receded. Economists did not find trade to have had substan-
tial adverse distributional effects in developed economies, either for low-skill workers specifically or
for import-competing factors and sectors more generally.1 The broad sentiment that emerged in the
literature was that labor-market developments were primarily attributable to technological changes
that complemented high-skill workers and reduced labor demand in manufacturing. The impact of
international trade on these outcomes seemed to be modest, at best.
Several pieces of evidence favored these conclusions. First, the share of U.S. employment in
1For formal surveys of the literature on trade and wages, see Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and Harrison, McLaren,
and McMillan (2011). In developing economies, the labor-market impacts of globalization have been more diffuse
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
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manufacturing had been in decline since the end of World War II, peaking at 39.0% of U.S. nonfarm
employment in January of 1944 and then falling decade over decade to a low of 8.6% in June 2015
(Figure 1). The disappearance of manufacturing jobs was ‘nothing new.’ Second, the steep rise
in wage inequality and fall in real wages of low-education workers in the U.S. and many other
developed countries did not coincide closely with rising trade openness. As noted by Feenstra (1998)
and Leamer (2000), the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP in the developed world rose steeply
during the 1970s but stabilized thereafter, a fact that greatly weakened the case for trade causing
rising wage inequality and falling low-skill wages during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Third, contrary to the predictions of textbook trade models, manufacturing industries in de-
veloped countries appeared to be substituting towards high-skill workers despite rising skill prices,
suggesting that these industries were experiencing a skill-biased demand shift that emanated log-
ically from the adoption of new technology (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998). Although trade
in the form of offshoring may produce such demand shifts, its modest scale in the 1980s and early
1990s meant that its estimated impacts were far smaller than those of investments in high-tech
capital and equipment (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999).2 Finally, simple “factor content” calibration
exercises—which rescaled traded-good imports into embodied labor imports—found that rising trade
integration could account for only a small part of the fall in relative wages of low-skill workers in the
U.S. (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Krugman, 2000).3 When Richard Freeman asked in 1995 if
U.S. wages were “being set in Beijing,” his answer was an emphatic no.
The trade and wages debate reached something of a coda around the year 2000. A reasonable
summary of the contemporaneous consensus was that:
1. Trade had not in recent decades been a major contributor to declining manufacturing employ-
ment or rising wage inequality in developed countries;
2. Workers employed in regions specializing in import-competing sectors could readily reallocate
to other regions if displaced by trade; and
3. Due to the ’law of one price’ for skill, any labor market impacts of trade would be felt by
low-skill workers generally, not by trade-exposed workers specifically.
2A further development, seen initially as damning for trade-based explanations of changes in labor-market out-
comes, was the simultaneous rise in wage inequality in developed and developing economies (Berman, Bound, and
Machin, 1998). We now know that either in the presence of offshoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) or of heterogeneous firms and skill-technology complementarity (Burstein and Vogel, 2012;
Sampson, 2014), greater economic integration between countries may cause wage inequality to rise worldwide.
3The usefulness of factor-content calculations for predicting labor-market outcomes was the subject of a spirited
debate in the 1990s (Krugman, 2000; Leamer, 2000). This debate has since been largely resolved by the discovery
that a tight (though structurally model-specific) relationship between the factor content of trade and relative factor
prices holds for a wide class of trade theories (Burstein and Vogel, 2011).
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A corollary of these observations is that trade should affect prevailing wage levels nationally but not
employment rates locally or regionally. Moreover, given the presumed fluidity of U.S. labor markets,
even in the short- or medium-run the aggregate gains from trade in the U.S. should be positive.4
Figure 1: Manufacturing Share of U.S. Nonfarm Employment, 1939 - 2015
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Just as the economics profession was reaching consensus on the consequences of trade for wages
and employment, an epochal shift in patterns of world trade was gaining momentum. China, for
centuries an economic laggard, was finally emerging as a great power, and toppling established
patterns of trade accordingly. The advance of China, as we argue below, has also toppled much
of the received empirical wisdom about the impact of trade on labor markets. The consensus that
trade could be strongly redistributive in theory but was relatively benign in practice has not stood
up well to these new developments. Nor has the belief that trade adjustment is relatively frictionless,
with impacts that diffuse over large skill categories rather than being concentrated among groups
of workers in trade-competing industries or locations. In quantifying these impacts and adjustment
frictions, recent evidence further suggests that the short and medium-run adjustment costs demanded
4While these views may appear as a straw man, they are not. On point (1), see Baily and Bosworth (2014).
On points (2) and (3), see Edwards and Lawrence (2010). And on the broader implications of these points, see the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 2015, chapter 7.
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by large trade shocks are sizable entries in the accounting of gains from trade.
China’s rise has provided a rare opportunity for studying the impact of a large trade shock
on labor markets in developed economies. An emerging literature on this topic offers a wealth of
evidence and surprises that should catalyze and discipline research for many years to come. We
believe that this evidence calls into question the consensus of the early 2000s, and makes clear that,
after the early Bretton Woods era aberration, the distributional consequences of trade are alive and
well. While these results do not at all suggest that international trade is in the aggregate harmful
to nations—indeed, China’s unprecedented rise from widespread poverty bears testimony to trade’s
transformative economic power—it makes clear that trade not only has benefits but also significant
costs. These include distributional costs, which theory has long recognized, and adjustment costs,
which the literature has tended to downplay. Better understanding when and where trade is costly,
and how and why it may be beneficial, are key items on the research agenda for trade and labor
economists. Developing effective tools for managing and mitigating the costs of trade adjustment
should be high on the agenda for policymakers and applied economists.
This essay discusses findings from the rapidly growing literature on China’s rise that have en-
riched our understanding of the impact of trade shocks on developed countries. We begin by dis-
cussing why China’s long-awaited reemergence is helpful for studying the impacts of trade on labor-
market outcomes. We then offer a simple theoretical framework that guides inquiry on measuring
and interpreting these impacts. Next, we present evidence on how trade shocks originating in China
have affected industries and plants, local labor markets housing those plants, and individual workers
employed (or formerly employed) in those industries and local markets. We suggest how these re-
sults should cause us to rethink the short- and medium-run gains from trade. Finally, we argue that
having failed to anticipate how significant the dislocations from trade might be, it is incumbent on
the literature to more convincingly estimate the gains from trade, such that the case for free trade is
not based on the sway of theory alone, but on a foundation of evidence that illuminates who gains,
who loses, by how much, and under what conditions.
2 China’s Rise
On June 23, 1989, the Wall Street Journal marked the publication of its centennial edition by
predicting what the global economy would look like 25 years hence. It selected the countries that
it thought would be growth leaders and those it saw as future growth laggards. On the former list
were Bangladesh, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. On the latter list was China, which, the newspaper
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prognosticated, would fail to shake off “the stultifying bureaucracy of hard-line communism.”5
The Journal ’s predictions reveal just how uncertain China’s future appeared in the late 1980s.
After a decade of “reform and opening” under Deng Xiaoping, hardliners had reestablished control
over economic policy. Their resurgence, fueled on the economic side by rising inflation and on the
political side by the events at Tiananmen Square, caused reform to stall and cast doubt on China’s
market transition (Naughton, 2007). Seen in this context, skepticism about China’s future, though
far off the mark from today’s vantage point, would then have been entirely warranted.
Figure 2: China’s Share of World Manufacturing Activity, 1990 - 2012
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Source: World Development Indicators.
China's share of world manuf turing activity
China’s quarter century of dizzying export growth began once the reformist camp reaffirmed its
authority over economic policy in the early 1990s. Deng, in one of the final political gambits of his
career, launched his famous “southern tour” in 1992 to focus national attention on the successes of
earlier policy experiments in a handful of locations on China’s east coast (Vogel, 2011). These efforts
had included the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which allowed foreign companies to set
up factories that imported inputs and exported final outputs, relatively free from the interference of
government minders (Yu and Tian, 2012; Alder, Shao and Zilibotti, 2013). As reformers retook the
helm, China embraced global markets more fully, pushing the number of SEZs from 20 in 1991 to
5George Anders, “How We Saw the Future in 1989,” The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2014, p. R13.
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150 in 2010. According to the World Bank, inflows of foreign direct investment, which had averaged
only 0.7% of GDP during the 1980s, surged to 4.2% of GDP during the 1990s and 2000s. Production
for foreign markets began a spectacular ascent, with China’s share of world manufacturing exports
growing from 2.3% in 1991 to 18.8% in 2013 (Figure 2).6
To provide context for China’s reintegration into the world economy, we highlight key aspects
of its recent performance that inform the analysis of attendant labor-market outcomes in developed
countries. One is the idiosyncratic nature of China’s transition from central planning to market
orientation. The momentum of this transition—which has propelled China’s trade—owes much more
to dismal conditions in China at the time of Mao’s death than to China’s subsequent responses to
contemporaneous shocks in high-income economies. Also important is the nature of China’s post-
reform manufacturing surge. When and how China became “the global factory” is important for
defining the scope and intensity of the China trade shock. Then, there is the structure of global trade
balances. China’s penchant for running large current account surpluses has shaped the temporal
distribution of trade gains and losses arising from its growth.
2.1 Making Use of Trade Shocks
The interest of trade economists in China is driven both by its large quantitative importance as an
exporter of manufactured goods, and by the paucity of natural experiments in international trade.
Among the most challenging issues for empirical analysis is that changes in trade policy in one
country are often dictated by changes in the behavior of its trading partners. Consider the North
American Free Trade Agreement, enacted in 1994. After investing heavily in Mexico in the 1980s and
early 1990s, multinational companies lobbied hard for the U.S. Congress to approve the pact.7 The
treaty’s passage, which contributed to a further expansion in foreign direct investment, was arguably
induced at least in part by the earlier FDI. In the NAFTA case, as in similar episodes of economic
opening, identifying trade’s impact on labor markets is complicated by the joint determination of
trade barriers and trade and investment flows.8
Three features of China’s experience help to overcome these challenges in identifying the casual
effects of trade shocks. The first is the unexpected nature of China’s export growth, which caught
many observers—including those at the Wall Street Journal—by surprise. Even after the launching
of reform in the 1980s, few anticipated how important China would become for the world economy.
6See Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) on the factors that have shaped China’s development process.
7See, e.g., Joshua Mills, “Business Lobbying for Trade Pact Appears to Sway Few in Congress,” New York Times,
November 12, 1993.
8See McLaren and Hakobyan (2015) on the local labor market effects of NAFTA in the United States.
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Between 1984 and 1990, China’s share of world manufacturing exports ticked up only modestly,
from 1.2% to 1.9%. Its trade expansion did not begin in earnest until the 1990s, a full decade
and a half after Mao’s death. China’s post Tiananmen crackdown made it difficult to foresee the
confluence of events that would allow it to unleash its potential. After all, the Chinese economy had
underperformed relative to Western Europe during every epoch since the 1500s (Zhu, 2012).
Second is the degree of China’s isolation under Mao, which created abundant opportunities for
later catch up (Zhu, 2012; Brandt, Ma, and Rawski, 2014). The distortions of the Maoist era
kept China far inside its production frontier. Between 1952 and 1978—from three years after the
Communist Party’s rise to power until Deng’s rehabilitation following Mao’s death—China’s GDP
per capita sank from 59th in the world to 134th out of 167 Penn World Table countries.9 By 1991,
China’s income ranking had nudged up modestly from 134th to 126th in the world. Convergence
did not begin in earnest until the rapid globalization of the ensuing two decades. By 2001, China’s
income ranking had risen to 101st and by 2011 it had reached 77th. Once China’s economy took
off, it ignited a phase of transitional growth that was governed largely by the country’s accumulated
productivity gap with the developed world (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011).10
A final key feature of China’s rise—which we explore in more detail below—is its distinctive
comparative advantage. Manufacturing is at the heart of the country’s economic turnaround. Be-
tween 1991 and 2012, China’s share of world manufacturing value added increased by a factor of
six, from 4.1% to 24.0% (Figure 2). Whereas many large emerging economies specialize in primary
commodities—Brazil in iron ore, Indonesia in rubber, and Russia in oil and gas—China’s advantage
is overwhelmingly in industrial goods. Over the period 1990 to 2013, the manufacturing sector aver-
aged 88% of China’s merchandise exports, compared to 50% for Brazil, 46% for Indonesia, and 20%
for Russia.11 This trade concentration means that China’s growth has represented a large positive
net global supply shock for manufacturing and a large positive net global demand shock for raw
materials. The impacts of China’s rise are consequently likely to vary across regional and national
economies according to their initial patterns of industry specialization.
2.2 The Global Factory
9These ranks are of GDP at constant national prices (in 2005 U.S. dollars) from the Penn World Tables 8.0.
10This period of transitional growth will of course come to an end ultimately and indeed may have ended already.
See Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2013) for a discussion.
11Over time, China has become even more specialized in manufacturing. Between 1990 and 2007, the share of
manufacturing in China’s merchandise exports rose from 72% to 93%, a level at which it has since stabilized.
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Figure 3: The Evolution of China’s Imports and Exports
A. Exports Minus Imports as a Share of GDP for China
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Revealed comparative advantage for China
China’s manufacturing performance reflects a comparative advantage in the sector that remained
latent during the Maoist era. Today, China’s net exports in manufacturing are strongly positive and
its net exports of raw materials are strongly negative (Figure 3A). Its true strength in the sector
emerged only in the 1990s. Figure 3B plots revealed comparative advantage (RCA: a country’s share
of global exports in an industry divided by its share of aggregate global exports) for China in two
broad sectors, manufacturing and primary commodities, where the latter group comprises foods,
fuels, ores and metals.12 It was not until 1992 that China moved from disadvantage to advantage
12The denominator in China’s RCA index is the country’s share of world merchandise exports. Following World
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in manufacturing, as indicated by positive log RCA values, and from advantage to disadvantage in
primary commodities, as indicated by negative log RCA values. The strength of China in manufac-
turing surely reflects its abundant supply of labor relative to the rest of the world (Amiti and Freund,
2010). The massive increase in China’s industrial labor force—resulting from the decollectivization
of agriculture, the closing of inefficient state-owned enterprises, and the migration of 250 million
workers from farms to cities—has made China the default location for all manner of labor-intensive
production (Li, Li, Wu, and Xiong, 2012). Yet, factor abundance cannot be the whole story be-
hind the country’s specialization. Its advantage is far from uniform across labor-intensive industries
(Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014). Figure 4 plots the change in net import penetration from
China between 1991 and 2007 against the share of production workers in total employment in 1991
for 397 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries.13 We group industries into 10 sectoral aggregates,
which share a common marker in the figure. That few points in Figure 4 show a negative change
in net import penetration over the period reveals how U.S. imports from China grew by more than
exports—often substantially by more—in nearly every industry.
The dominant pattern in Figure 4 is that industries within a sector tend to occupy a relatively
narrow range on the horizontal axis—indicating similar within-sector labor intensity—but a wide
range on the vertical axis—indicating highly varying within-sector changes in import penetration.14
Apparel, leather, and textiles stand out in Figure 4 as the most labor-intensive activity, with an
average initial share of production workers in industry total employment of 0.85. Still, the industries
within this sector diverge sharply in their changes in import penetration. In some (e.g., women’s
non-athletic footwear, waterproof outerwear), the increase in penetration approaches or even exceeds
100 percent, which indicates that the 1991 to 2007 growth in imports from China is nearly equal to
or greater than initial domestic spending on the industry. Other industries in the sector (e.g., coated
fabrics, automotive and apparel trimmings) show near zero increase in import penetration. Similar
patterns of dispersion hold for sectors with comparably high labor intensity, such as furniture and
wood products (average initial production worker share of 0.82) and toys and miscellaneous products
(average initial production worker share of 0.72).15
Bank definitions, manufacturing includes SITC sectors 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures except for division 68),
7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods). Food, fuels, ores and metals
include SITC sectors 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), 2 (crude materials), 3 (mineral fuels), and
4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats), and division 68 (non-ferrous metals).
13The change in import penetration is the 1991 to 2007 change in U.S. imports from China divided by 1991 U.S.
domestic absorption (shipments plus imports minus exports); it is Winsorized at -20 and 100 in the figure. The
employment share of production workers uses 1991 values from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
14Employment of production workers is a standard, but not problem free, measure of industry intensity in low-skill
labor. See Katz and Autor (1999) on the relation between production worker intensity and skill intensity.
15An industry-level regression of the change in net import penetration between 1991 and 2007 on 10 subsector
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Figure 4: ∆China-U.S. Net Import Penetration in Detailed Manufacturing Industries, 1991 - 2007
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Gr
ow
th
 N
et
 Im
po
rt 
Pe
ne
tr.
 1
99
1-
20
07
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of Production Workers 1991
 food/tobacco  textile/apparel/leather
 wood/furniture  paper/print
 chemical/petroleum  plastic/rubber/glass
 metal/metal products  machines/electrical
 transportation  toys/other
The cross-industry variation in Chinese export growth evident in Figure 4 is far from unusual.
The distribution of comparative advantage across industries for a country tends to be fat-tailed,
such that for most countries a relatively small number of products dominate exports (Hanson, Lind,
and Muendler, 2015). Because of this skewness, U.S. industries—and the regions in which they
locate—vary widely in their exposure to import competition from China. As we discuss in section
4, this variation is very useful for identifying the labor-market consequences of trade shocks.
China’s export surge in manufacturing accelerated after 2001, the year in which the country
entered the World Trade Organization (Figure 2). On first consideration, it is puzzling why WTO
accession should have mattered much for China’s trade. Europe and the U.S. had granted China
most-favored nation (MFN) status as far back as the 1980s. WTO membership would seem to have
done little more than formalize trade relations that were already two decades old. Still, something
happened to deepen China’s manufacturing prowess: between 1998 and 2007 productivity in the
sector grew at the astounding pace of 8% per year (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012).
dummies has an r-squared value of just 0.17, indicating that the majority of the variation in penetration occurs across
detailed industries within subsectors.
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Although the literature has yet to provide a full accounting of China’s recent export growth, it has
uncovered several mechanisms through which reform strengthened its manufacturing industries.
One such mechanism is privatization. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China idled many state-
owned manufacturing enterprises, moving towards compliance with WTO provisions that sanction
state subsidies for domestic industries. Capital and labor were then reallocated from smaller, less
productive state-owned companies to privately owned manufacturing plants, raising productivity
and output in the sector (Hsieh and Song, 2015). Joining the WTO also forced China to phase out
requirements that had obligated many private establishments to export through state intermediaries.
Such restrictions constitute barriers to export, which the WTO forbids expressly. Bai, Krishna,
and Ma (2015) estimate that had private firms not been granted direct trading rights, China’s
manufacturing exports in the 2000s would have been one third smaller than they were. Along with
greater ease in exporting, WTO membership gave Chinese manufacturers greater access to imported
intermediate inputs (Brandt and Morrow, 2014), which were an added boon to productivity (Manova
and Zhang, 2012). A further consequence of China’s WTO entry regards the insecurity of its earlier
MFN access to the U.S. market. Prior to 2001, China’s MFN status in the U.S. was subject to annual
reauthorization by Congress. Pierce and Schott (2015) and Handley and Limao (2014) argue that
the lurking prospect of a return to non-MFN tariffs, which averaged 37.0% in 1999 and compared to
average MFN tariffs of only 3.4% in that year, dissuaded Chinese firms from investing in exporting
to the U.S.. WTO accession removed this uncertainty, and encouraged China-U.S. trade.
2.3 The Global Macroeconomic Context
The impact of China’s recent growth on the global economy is not just about the country’s long-run
comparative advantage. Also important for the near-term labor-market consequences of its trade
expansion is that China’s trade surplus widened substantially. Figure 5 shows the current account
balance as a share of GDP for China and the United States from 1985 to 2012. China’s average
current account surplus rose from 1.7% of GDP in the 1990s to 4.8% in the 2000s. In mirror-like
fashion, the average U.S. current account deficit rose from 1.6% of GDP in the 1990s to 4.4% in the
2000s. In a world economy with many countries, there is no reason why the trade balance for any
one country would be related systematically to that for any other country. However, because the
U.S. dollar functions as a global reserve currency, China’s massive net capital outflows have been
associated with net foreign purchases of dollar-denominated assets.
In trade theory, it is standard to assume that trade is balanced and to analyze the impact of trade
shocks on the long-run global equilibrium. Why should trade imbalances matter for the labor-market
11
consequences of China’s growth? With balanced trade, growth in China’s exports is matched by
growth in its imports. While the United States sees greater import competition in some industries,
it also sees expanded exports elsewhere in manufacturing and in other traded sectors. China’s rise
may cause U.S. workers to reallocate from one traded industry to another but it would not cause
them necessarily to exit the traded sector altogether.
Figure 5: U.S. and China Current Account Balances (% of GDP) 1985 - 2012
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Trade imbalances complicate matters by introducing a temporal dimension into sectoral em-
ployment adjustment.16 Suppose that policy distortions in China—such as the excess absorption of
credit by state-owned enterprises (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011)—induce the country to
run a trade surplus and the U.S. to run a trade deficit. Growth in China’s manufacturing sector
due to enhanced productivity arising from its market transition would cause employment in U.S.
traded industries to contract, pushing workers either into non-traded jobs or out of work entirely.
In effect, China would be loaning the U.S. the funds that it needs to enjoy positive net imports
today.17 In Figure 4, few U.S. industries saw an increase in net exports to China between 1991
16See Crino and Epifani (2014) on how changes in trade balances affect labor-market outcomes in a North-South
trade model.
17This logic, of course, applies to a two-country world. In a many-country world, there is no necessary connection
between bilateral trade and bilateral capital flows.
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and 2007. At some point in the future, Chinese savings would be expected to fall and consumption
to rise, as China’s net exports turned negative and U.S. net exports turned positive. U.S. traded
output and employment would expand, and the United States would begin to repay China for its
earlier borrowing. In this long run scenario, China’s rising comparative advantage would generate
long-run employment losses in the U.S. traded industries in which China enjoyed a long-run com-
parative advantage, while trade imbalances cause additional short-run U.S. employment losses in
traded industries pushed temporarily into contraction.Why has China become such a large a net
creditor to the rest of the world? The literature attributes current account surpluses in China to
government interventions that have kept national savings at artificially high levels. One hypothe-
sized distortion is the government’s continued support for large state-owned enterprises.18 These
companies have first call on loans from state-run banks, leaving private businesses to finance invest-
ment out of retained earnings and thereby elevating the corporate savings rate (Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti, 2011). Another, and perhaps less obviously relevant, distortion is China’s one-child
policy (recently relaxed), which increased male-female birth ratios and intensified competition in the
marriage market (Wei and Zhang, 2011). Households whose one child is a son may have increased
their savings rate to finance real estate purchases as a means of improving their child’s marriage
prospects. A third distortion—advanced by think tanks and politicians in Washington, D.C. (see,
e.g., Cline, 2010)—is that China has consciously undervalued its nominal exchange rate so as to
promote its exports.19
3 Theory
Much first-generation research on trade and wages worked under the canonical version of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model (e.g., Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). The
attraction of the HO framework, and in particular of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, for analyzing
labor-market impacts of trade is its elegant connection between industry-level shocks (manifested
as externally given changes in product prices) and national factor-market outcomes (changes in
wages). The simplicity of this mapping perhaps explains why economists relied on the model for so
long, despite its dependence upon assumptions that range from the counterfactual—countries have
to remain within their initial ‘cone of diversification’—to the arcane—the number of final goods a
country produces has to equal to the number of primary factors.
18Although the private sector has grown substantially in China, state-owned companies remain an active part of the
economy (Hsieh and Song, 2015), especially in banking, communications, construction, energy, and transportation.
19The popular sentiment notwithstanding, the academic literature has had little success in finding empirical support
for systematic renminbi undervaluation (Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii, 2007).
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Frustration with HO turned out to be a boon to research on trade and labor markets. Early
approaches (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997 and 1999; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) flipped the
framework on its head by focusing on changes in the set of goods—or, more precisely, the set of
intermediate inputs—that countries produce. Allowing for changes in specialization patterns creates
a new adjustment margin between the production tasks a country performs at home and the others it
offshores. Recent work has married HO with modern trade theories that incorporate heterogeneous
firms. Burstein and Vogel (2012) embed a Melitz (2003) style model, in which firms differ according
to their productivity, into an otherwise standard HO setting. Calibrating the model, and allowing
for more productive firms to be more intensive in the use of high-skill labor, reveals that freer trade
affects the wage premium for high-skill labor primarily through the Melitz mechanism of within-
industry shifts in employment toward more productive firms rather than through the HO mechanism
of between-industry shifts in labor demand. In many analyses of the impact of productivity growth
in China on global welfare, the literature dispenses with HO entirely, relying either on a Melitz-type
setting (Hsieh and Ossa, 2015) or on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of Ricardian comparative
advantage (Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang, 2014). Gone from current literature is the singular
concern with estimating the impact of trade on the wage gap between high-skill and low-skill labor,
which preoccupied inquiry in the 1990s. In its place is interest in a wider array of margins through
which economies adjust to trade shocks.
The sketch of a theoretical framework that we provide in this section follows the recent trend
of working with trade models that have a gravity structure (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2012). These models do not lend themselves easily to studying the impact of trade on
earnings inequality. They do, however, make it tractable to allow for varying degrees of labor
mobility between regions or industries (Redding, 2012). The presence of frictions in worker mobility
creates an abundant set of margins along which we can observe how labor markets respond to trade
shocks.20 The task of empirical research then becomes to clarify which margins of adjustment are
operational, to estimate the magnitude of adjustment along each margin at different time horizons,
and to determine how long it takes for full adjustment to occur.
20On adjustment to trade shocks at the firm level, see Amiti and Davis (2012) and Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch
and Xiang (2014); on adjustment at the industry level, see Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Ebenstein, Harrison,
McMillan and Phillips (2014), and Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (forthcoming); and on adjustment to trade at the
regional level see Borjas and Ramey (1995), Topalova (2010), Kovak (2013), and McLaren and Hakobyan (2015).
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3.1 A Bare Bones Model
To characterize the theoretical mechanisms at work, it is sufficient to allow for a single labor-market
friction, which we designate as imperfect labor mobility across regions within a country. Allowing
for geographic labor immobility runs counter to the belief that U.S. regional labor markets are
integrated seamlessly. Yet there is mounting evidence that the movement of labor across U.S. cities
and states in the aftermath of changes in regional labor demand is slow and incomplete (Blanchard
and Katz, 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Yagan, 2014) and that such incompleteness is strongest
among less-educated workers (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak, 2010; Malamud and Wozniak,
2012; Diamond, 2015).21 Recent work on the impacts of trade with China, discussed in section 4,
likewise confirms the slowness of regional labor-market adjustment.
In our model sketch, we make the extreme assumption of complete geographic labor immobility.
In an Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework, one can relax this assumption by allowing for worker
heterogeneity in moving costs between regions (Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro, 2015) or for a Roy-type
structure with worker heterogeneity in industry productivity (Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi, 2015).
Either setting creates an upward sloping regional labor supply curve, whose slope may be steeper in
the short or medium run than in the long run. Variation in regional exposure to foreign competition
arises from differences in regional industry specialization patterns. In Eaton and Kortum, these
specialization patterns reflect exogenous regional differences in industry productivity. Empirical
work does not take a stand on the origin of industry specialization, treating it as pre-determined in
some period well before the China trade shock materializes.
We begin by describing how changes in China’s export supply affect U.S. industry product
demand, and are subsequently transmitted to changes in traded sector output at the U.S. regional
level. If trade has a gravity structure, we can write total demand by the U.S. aggregate economy
for traded output produced in U.S. region i as,
Xi =
∑
k
Aikτ
−θ
ik
Φk
Ek (1)
where Xi is total sales by region i in the aggregate U.S. market, Aik is the production capability
of region i in industry k, τik is the average iceberg transport cost for region i in shipping goods
in industry k to the aggregate U.S. market,22 θ is the trade cost elasticity, Ek is U.S. aggregate
21The empirical literature has yet to resolve whether slow regional employment responses to labor demand shocks
are the result of labor-market frictions (e.g., search costs) or economic distortions (e.g., social insurance programs), a
distinction that matters for welfare analyses of changes in the trading environment.
22For expositional simplicity, we treat the aggregate U.S. market—which is in truth a collection of distinct regional
markets—as a single entity. “Traded output” by region i thus refers to total shipments by the industries in i (e.g.,
manufacturing) that sell their output outside the region. Alternative versions of the gravity model differ in terms
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expenditure on goods in industry k, and Φk is the competitiveness of the aggregate U.S. market in
industry k, defined as Φk ≡
∑
i′ Ai′kτi′k
−θ.23
Consider the impact on traded output in region i of changes in production capabilities in the
regions that supply the U.S. Totally differentiating (1), and using xˆ ≡ dx/x, we obtain the following
equilibrium condition for the log change in region i’s output:
Xˆi =
∑
k
φikEˆk − θwˆi +
∑
k
φikAˆk −
∑
k
φik
∑
i′ 6=c
ρi′kAˆi′k −
∑
k
φikρckAˆck (2)
where φik ≡ Xik/Xi is the share of industry k in region i’s total sales on the U.S. market, ρik ≡
Xik/Ek is the share of region i in total U.S. purchases in industry k, and subscript c indexes China.
For simplicity, we assume that Aˆik = Aˆk − θwˆi, and that trade costs remained unchanged.24
Equation (2) provides a reduced-form specification for estimating the impact of trade shocks
emanating from China on regional economic activity in the U.S. or other countries. Most empirical
analyses of the China trade shock base estimation on a specification like (2) or its industry-level
counterpart.25 Of primary interest is the final term on the right of (2), which captures the impact
of growth in China’s productive capacity on traded output by U.S. region i. It can be rewritten as,
∑
k
φikρckAˆck =
∑
k
φik
[
XckAˆck
Ek
]
(3)
which is the weighted average exposure of region i to changes in U.S. industry import penetration
that is mandated by changes in China’s production capabilities. During the 1990s and 2000s,
advances in Chinese manufacturing were driven by the country’s market transition, which gave its
firms access to foreign capital, technology, and inputs; allowed capital to move from the public to
the private sector; permitted rural-to-urban migration; and ended restrictions on direct exporting
by private enterprises. The φik weights in (3)—the share of each industry in region i’s total sales on
the U.S. market—summarize differences in industry specialization patterns across U.S. regions and
thus capture variation in regional exposure to China’s supply-driven export growth.
of how Aik is determined. In Eaton and Kortum (2002), this value is the product of the location parameter for the
distribution of productivity for industry k in region i and unit production costs for industry k in region i.
23For simplicity, we ignore sales by U.S. regions to foreign markets. Incorporating these sales is straightforward.
Equilibrium conditions not shown include factor-market clearing, to which we return below, and the balance of trade,
discussed in the previous section.
24The first assumption implies that the change in production capability for region i in industry k can be decomposed
into the exogenous change in national productivity in industry k (Aˆk) and the change in wages in region i (wˆi),
consistent with Eaton and Kortum (2002). We thus assume that the exogenous determinants of regional comparative
advantage (e.g., the Eaton-Kortum productivity distribution location parameters) are unchanged.
25See, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2015).
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3.2 Identifying the Reduced-Form Impact of the China Trade Shock
To estimate the impact of the trade shock in equation (3) on regional labor-market outcomes, it is
necessary to control for the confounding factors that also affect these outcomes. Helpfully, these
confounds are summarized in the first four terms on the right of (2). Anticipating the estimation
approaches that we describe in section 4, we discuss each of these components in turn.
The first term on the right of (2),
∑
k φikEˆk, is regional exposure to U.S. industry demand
shocks. Because observed changes in import penetration from China will be affected by both the
first and last terms in (2), they will embody changes both in U.S. product demand and in China’s
supply conditions. Any reduced-form regression of changes in regional outcomes on regional trade
exposure may thus be contaminated by U.S. product demand shocks. Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) propose using Chinese import growth in other high-income markets as an instrument for the
growth in U.S. imports from China in order to isolate the foreign-supply-driven component of changes
in U.S. import penetration. Specifically, they instrument the observed change in U.S. industry-level
import penetration from China with a non-U.S. exposure variable that is constructed using data on
contemporaneous industry-level growth of Chinese exports to other high-income markets.26
Table 1 documents the operation of the Autor-Dorn-Hanson instrumental-variables strategy. The
first column of the table shows that annual U.S. imports from China increased by 304 billion dollars
between 1991 and 2007, while imports from China grew by 235 billion dollars across the eight other
high-income countries offering comparable trade data for the full sample period. Both the U.S.
and the other high income countries experienced rising imports in almost all of the 397 harmonized
four-digit manufacturing industries, and the pattern of import growth across industries is highly
correlated between the U.S. and the other countries (correlation coefficient of 0.92). The remaining
columns of the table show the same information separately for each of the eight other high income
countries. Remarkably, each of the comparison countries witnessed import growth in at least 343
of the 397 manufacturing industries, and industry patterns of imports are strongly correlated with
the U.S., with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.55 (Switzerland) to 0.96 (Australia). The fact
that China made comparable gains in penetration by detailed sector across numerous countries in
the same time interval suggests that China’s falling prices, rising quality, and diminishing trade and
tariff costs in these surging sectors are a root cause.
26These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
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Table 1: Imports from China in the U.S. and Other Developed Economies 1991 – 2007 (in Billions
of 2007$), and their Correlations with U.S.-China Imports
United States Japan Germany Spain Australia
∆ Chinese Imports (Bil$) 303.8 108.1 64.3 23.2 21.5
No. Industries with Import Growth 385 368 371 377 378
Correlation w/ U.S.-China Imports 1.00 0.86 0.91 0.68 0.96
Finland Denmark New Zealand Switzerland
∆ Chinese Imports (Bil$) 234.7 5.7 4.7 3.8 3.3
No. Industries with Import Growth 383 356 362 379 343
Correlation w/ U.S.-China Imports 0.92 0.58 0.62 0.92 0.55
First stage regressions (using import penetration variables as in ADHS QJE)
Japan Germany Spain Australia
coeff 1.918 3.897 9.203 13.646
se 0.112 0.136 0.551 0.495
t-stat 17.075 28.674 16.705 27.550
8 Non-U.S. Finland Denmark New Zealand Switzerland
coeff 1.169 16.041 24.541 61.478 40.995
se 0.046 1.368 2.250 2.866 3.408
t-stat 25.281 11.725 10.907 21.450 12.028
Correlations of  imports across 397 4-digit industries are weighted using 1991 industry employment from the NBER Manufacturing database.
8 Non-US 
Countries
Table 1. Imports from China in the U.S. and Other Developed Economies 1991 - 2007 (in Billions of  2007$),
and their Correlations with U.S.-China Imports
A possible threat to this supply-based explanation for Chinese export patterns is that product
demand shocks are correlated across high-income countries, in which case using cross-industry vari-
ation in China’s penetration in other high-income markets as an instrument for U.S. penetration
could confound import growth with unobserved components of demand. Autor, Dorn and Han-
son (2013) also utilize a gravity-based strategy that replaces the growth in U.S. imports from China
with the inferred change in China’s comparative advantage and market access vis-a-vis the U.S. This
gravity approach differences out import demand in the purchasing country, thereby retaining supply
and trade-cost-driven changes in China’s export performance. The residuals from this regression
approximate the percentage growth in imports from China due to changes in China’s productivity
and trade costs relative to the U.S.. Gravity and IV estimates turn out to be similar, which suggests
that correlated import demand shocks are not overly important for the estimation.
Moving to the second term on the right of equation (2), θwˆi is the endogenous change in wages
in U.S. region i resulting from external product-market shocks. Most empirical analyses exclude
wages as an independent variable. Estimating (2) without wages on the right-hand side captures the
reduced-form impact of trade exposure on economic activity in region i that works either directly
through changes in industry output or indirectly through feedback effects from changes in local
wages.27 Alternatively, estimating a version of (2) that makes either the change in regional wages or
the change in regional labor supply the dependent variable provides a test of the geographic mobility
of labor in response to trade-induced labor demand shocks.
The third term on the right of (2),
∑
k φikAˆk, captures exposure of region i to changes in national
industry productivity. Another consequence of regions varying in their specialization patterns is that
27See Kovak (2013) on the impact of trade shocks on wages in Brazil based on a specific factors model.
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they will differ in their exposure to sector-biased technological progress. Are regions that are more
subject to technology shocks also ones that tend to face greater import competition? It appears not.
There is near zero correlation between exposure to technological change and exposure to trade with
China across U.S. local labor markets (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013b, 2015).28 A related issue,
to which we return in section 4, is whether exposure to trade with low-wage countries induces firms
to step up innovation, making technology endogenous to trade.
Finally, the fourth term in (2),
∑
k φik
∑
i′ 6=c ρi′kAˆi′k, captures changes in production capabilities
in other supplying countries. These changes may be in part a response to changes in supply conditions
in China. If we exclude this term from the estimation, we model changes in supply capabilities in
other countries implicitly as a reduced-form function of changes in industry productivity in China.29
The specification in (2) does not comprise an input-output structure. The presence of interme-
diate inputs may affect the transmission of trade shocks within the U.S. Consider the case of tire
production. If rising imports of Chinese tires causes U.S. tire producers to reduce their output,
demand for U.S.-made synthetic rubber and steel fiber, which are used as inputs in domestic tire
production, may decline as well. The trade shock, which began in the U.S. tire industry, would also
affect domestic demand in the industries that supply inputs to U.S. synthetic rubber and steel fiber
producers, as the shock works its way up the production chain. A full accounting of the impact of
trade shocks thus requires incorporating input-output linkages between domestic industries (Pierce
and Schott, 2015; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price, 2016). A related possibility is that
U.S. synthetic rubber and steel fiber producers may benefit from access to lower-cost inputs from
China. Recent literature allows for both channels of transmission, from U.S. final goods producers
to their domestic input suppliers and from Chinese input suppliers to U.S. input buyers.
To summarize this discussion, identifying the impact of trade with China on U.S. local labor
market outcomes requires a valid instrumental variable—or, more broadly, a source of plausibly
exogenous variation—for regional exposure to import competition, controls for regional exposure to
technological change, and recognition that the estimated reduced-form impact may be attenuated
28Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013b and 2015) measure regional technology exposure using an occupational compo-
sition index that captures the opportunities for substitution of computers for workplace tasks. This index is highly
correlated with measures of computer adoption (Autor and Dorn, 2013), but it is necessarily incomplete and would not
be expected to capture industry-specific innovations that deviate from the overall pace of machine-labor substitution.
29China’s manufacturing growth is closely related to the expansion of global production networks in East Asia
(Hsieh and Woo, 2005). As China has grown, so too has its demand for imported inputs, which it assembles into final
outputs for shipment abroad. During the 2000s, approximately half of China’s manufacturing exports were produced
by export processing plants, which are dedicated solely to assembly of imported components (Yu and Tian, 2012).
Over time, China has begun to produce an ever greater fraction of the inputs that it uses in export production, as it
diversifies away from pure processing trade (Brandt and Morrow, 2014). Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2012) estimate
that the share of domestic value added in China’s total exports—the fraction of China’s exports composed of value
added in China—rose from 50% in 1997 to 62% in 2007.
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by labor migration between regions. An alternative approach to identification is to utilize changes
in imports that result from changes in trade policy. Topalova (2010), Kovak (2013), and McLaren
and Hakobyan (2014) estimate the change in local incomes or employment due to greater import
competition that arises from tariff reductions mandated by trade reforms in India, Brazil, and North
America, respectively. Tariff reductions are a less obvious source of the increase in imports from
China by developed economies. By the early 1990s, most developed nations, including the U.S.,
already provided China with MFN access to their markets, implying an average import tariff of
under four percent. Trade barriers in these countries did decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
as a result of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, but the average decline was less than two percentage
points, except in apparel and textiles (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2015). Hence, changes in
applied tariffs would seem to predict no more than modest growth in China’s shipments to the U.S.
We discuss below how the observed reduction in U.S. MFN tariffs may not capture the full impact
of changes in U.S. trade barriers on imports from China (Pierce and Schott, 2015).
4 Labor Market Adjustment to Trade
If we suppose that the growth in U.S. manufacturing imports from China was triggered by a combi-
nation of productivity growth and improving foreign market access for Chinese firms, the shock that
originated across the Pacific would first manifest itself in the U.S. in terms of more intense compe-
tition in product markets. Next, the shock would be transmitted to the regions in which competing
manufacturing industries are concentrated, to the U.S. sectors that supply these industries with
inputs, and to the workers employed in manufacturing and its supplier industries. In this section,
we empirically trace out the impacts of the China trade shock by examining consequences at each
of these levels.
4.1 Industry Adjustment to Import Competition
The initial point of transmission of supply shocks in China to factor markets in the U.S. is the product
market. Improvements in China’s productive capabilities and reductions in its trade costs will change
the intensity of competition for U.S. goods, leading to a contraction in U.S. industries subject to
greater import exposure. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) use data on U.S. manufacturing plants
for 1977 to 1997 to examine the consequences of increased exposure to import competition from low-
wage countries, which they measure as the share of these economies in U.S. imports and which is
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attributable in large account to China.30 They find that over five-year intervals, industries facing
greater increases in exposure to trade are subject to higher rates of plant exit.31 Among the plants
that survive, those in more trade-exposed sectors have larger reductions in employment and a higher
likelihood of changing their primary four-digit manufacturing category.
Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016) provide a complementary analysis to Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) that moves the focus to the industry level and extends the data forward
in time to cover the period 1991 to 2011.32 Consistent with the logic of equation (2), they estimate
the following model for the impact of shifts in trade exposure on manufacturing employment:
∆Ljτ = ατ + β1∆IP jτ + γXj0 + ejτ . (4)
Here, ∆Ljτ is 100 times the annual log change in employment in industry j over subperiod τ ;
∆IP jτ is 100 times the annual change in import penetration from China in U.S. manufacturing
industry j over subperiod τ ; β1 is the estimated effect of exposure to import competition on industry
employment; Xj0 is a set of industry-specific start of period controls (suppressed initially); ατ is a
period-specific constant; and ejτ is an error term.33 Table 2, reproduced from their results, shows
that the employment-weighted mean industry saw Chinese import exposure rise by 0.5 percentage
points per year between 1991 and 2011, with more rapid penetration in the period of 1999 through
2007—during China’s WTO accession—than from 1991 through 1999.34 Growth from 2007 to 2011
indicates a marked slowdown in import expansion following the onset of the global financial crisis,
which halted trade growth worldwide (Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2010). Table 2 also shows
that the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment accelerated over time: the average industry
contracted by 0.3 log points per year between 1991 and 1999 and by 3.6 log points per year between
1999 and 2007 and by 5.7 log points per year in the Great Recession period of 2007 to 2011.35
30This measure does not correspond to the theoretical concept of import penetration in equation (3). However,
because most of the temporal variation in the Bernard, Jensen, and Schott measure is in the numerator—due to
China’s massive export growth—the share of U.S. imports from low-wage countries and the change in U.S. import
penetration due to low-wage countries are highly correlated.
31Similar effects are observed for other countries: Growing Chinese import competition increases plant exit and
reduces firm growth in Mexico (Iacovone, Rauch and Winters, 2013; Utar and Torres-Ruiz, 2013) and reduces employ-
ment growth in Belgian firms (Mion and Zhu, 2013), Danish firms (Utar, 2014), and in a panel of firms from twelve
European countries (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2015).
32In related work, Pierce and Schott (2015) compare sectors that varied in their vulnerability to China’s joining to
the WTO. Prior to the 2001 accession, the U.S. Congress decided annually whether to rescind MFN status on China
and impose much higher non-MFN tariffs. Relative to pre-2001 trends, employment declines after 2001 were greater
in U.S. manufacturing industries that had larger initial gaps between MFN and non-MFN tariffs.
33Import penetration is defined here as ∆IP jτ = ∆MUCj,τ / (Yj,91 +Mj,91 − Ej,91), where Yj is domestic output, Mj
is imports, Ej is exports, and ∆MUCj,τ is the change in U.S. imports from China.
34Table 2 slightly aggregates the 397 manufacturing industries of Figure 4 to 392 industries in order to improve
compatibility with other industry-level data such as the BEA input-output tables.
35Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Philips (2014) describe how employment conditions change in the industries
and occupations that are more exposed to U.S. multinational companies moving production offshore. In mild contrast
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Table 2: Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment,
1991 - 2011
1991-1999 1999-2011 1999-2007 2007-2011
Mean/SD Median Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
0.50 0.14 0.27 0.66 0.84 0.30
(0.94) (0.75) (1.33) (1.61) (1.68)
-2.71 -2.05 -0.30 -4.32 -3.62 -5.73
(3.07) (3.49) (3.85) (4.15) (5.02)
Based&on&AADHP&Tab&1.
Based&on&AADHP&Tab&1.
Table 2. Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment.
Statistics are based on 392 4-digit manufacturing industries. The change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports is computed by dividing 100 x the annualized 
increase in the value of  U.S. imports over the indicated period by 1991 U.S. market volume in that industry. Employment changes are computed in the 
County Business Patterns. All observations are weighted by 1991 industry employment.
1991-2011
100 x Annual ∆ in U.S. 
Exposure to Chinese Imports
100 x Annual Log ∆ in Emp. 
(Manufacturing Industries)
Table 3: Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment,
1991 - 2011
1991-2007
(1) (2) (3)
-0.81*** -1.30*** -1.24***
(0.16) (0.41) (0.37)
1{1991-1999} -0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
1{1999-2011} -3.79*** -3.46***
(0.33) (0.33)
1{1999-2007} -2.58***
(0.38)
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Based&on&AADHP&Tab&2.
Table 3. Effect of  Import Exposure on Log Employment Change in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries: OLS and 2SLS Estimates.
N = 784 (392 4-digit manufacturing industries x 2 periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2011 or 1999-2007). 
Employment changes are computed in the County Business Patterns and are expressed as 100 x 
annual log changes. Observations are weighted by 1991 employment. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered on 135 3-digit industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Stacked First Differences
1991-2011
100 x Annual ∆ in U.S. 
Exposure to Chinese Imports
Table 3, also based on Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016), presents estimates
of equation (4) in stacked first differences for the two time periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2011. For
these results, the change in import penetration and a dummy for each time period are the only re-
gressors. In column 1, which estimates the model without instrumentation, the import penetration
variable is negative and highly significant, consistent with the hypothesis that rising import exposure
to the above results, they find that trade exposure affects employment not through workers’ industry of employment
but through their occupation of employment.
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lowers domestic industry employment. Nevertheless, this OLS point estimate could be biased be-
cause growth in import penetration is driven partly by domestic shocks. Column 2 instruments the
observed changes in industry import penetration with contemporaneous changes in other-country
China imports, as described above. The estimate in column 2 implies that a one-percentage-point
rise in industry import penetration reduces domestic industry employment by 1.3 log points (t-ratio
of 3.2). Column 3 which stacks the periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2007, shows that the coefficient of
import penetration is similar if we restrict attention to the years preceding the Great Recession.
While it is clear empirically that employment in import-competing U.S. industries has shrunk
in the face of China’s rapid growth, the challenge for research is how to measure the distributional
consequences and the net economic costs and benefits of these labor-market impacts. The answers
turn on mechanisms that are not self-evident from the basic facts above; specifically:
1. Given the spatial concentration of manufacturing, do industry shocks translate into localized
employment shocks—and if so, are they offset or amplified by local labor market mechanisms?
2. To what extent are trade-induced industry employment contractions offset by employment
gains elsewhere in the U.S. economy, potentially outside of trade-impacted regions?
3. Do trade adjustments occur on the employment margin, the wage margin, or both? If on the
employment margin, what are the costs to individual workers and to the public at large?
4. Are the costs of trade adjustment borne disproportionately by workers employed at trade-
impacted firms and residing in trade-impacted local labor markets? Or do these shocks diffuse
nationally, thus moderating their concentrated effects?
We consider these questions below, highlighting both what is known and what remains unanswered.
4.2 Regional Employment Impacts
To assess the distributional consequences of rising trade with China, we turn next to adjustments
in local labor markets. Local exposure arises from the tendency of industries to cluster in specific
regions of a country (Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010). In the U.S., manufacturing employment is
particularly concentrated in parts of the Midwest and Southeast. Even within these manufacturing
regions, there is wide variation in the industry composition of local firms. Industry composition
may be affected by trade shocks, however. In measuring regional trade exposure, we follow the
literature in utilizing data on regional industry specialization patterns in the pre-shock period, thus
preempting any endogenous adjustment of industry location to contemporaneous trade shocks.
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Figure 6: Geographic Exposure to Trade Shocks at the Commuting Zone (CZ) Level
A. Quartiles of Unconditional Exposure
B. Quartiles of Exposure Conditional on Manufacturing Employment Share
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) examine the impact of Chinese competition on U.S. commuting
zones (CZs), drawing on data from the U.S. Census, the American Community Survey and the
County Business Patterns for the years 1990 to 2007. CZs are clusters of counties that have the
commuting structure of a local labor market (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Figure
6 shows the spatial distribution of exposure to increases in Chinese import competition from 1991 to
2007 across CZs. In the map of unconditional import exposure in Panel A, some broad regions have
greater vulnerability to imports simply because they are more specialized in manufacturing overall.
For instance, Alabama and Tennessee, both strongly manufacturing-oriented, have a preponderance
of trade-exposed commuting zones. Variation of trade intensity within regions becomes larger in
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Figure 6B, which plots import exposure conditional on the share of manufacturing in CZ employment
as of 1990, thus measuring import competition for the local set of manufacturing industries. When
looking within manufacturing, Tennessee, owing largely to its concentration of furniture producers,
is far more exposed to trade with China than is Alabama, which has agglomerations of relatively
insulated heavy industry. This variation of import exposure within local manufacturing sectors is
the basis for much of the econometric analysis we discuss.
Table 4: Import Competition and Outcomes in U.S. Local Labor Markets, 1990 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.60*** -0.18 0.22*** 0.55***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.06) (0.15)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.05 -0.76*** -549.3*** 57.7***
(0.75) (0.25) (169.4) (18.4)
Based&on&ADH&Tab&5/6/8/9.
With an average annual wage of about $40k per employee, the employment loss by 0.78%pt lowers annual income by about $312 (0.0078*40000).
Table 4. Estimated Impact of  a $1K per Worker Increase on Chinese Import Exposure on Outcomes in 
U.S. Local Labor Markets, 1990-2007: 2SLS Estimates
N=1444 (722 commuting zones x 2 time periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2007). Employment, population and income data is 
based on U.S. Census and American Community Survey data, while transfer payments are based on BEA Regional 
Economic Accounts. All regressions control for the start of  period percentage of  employment in manufacturing, college-
educated population, foreign-born population, employment among women, employment in routine occupations, average 
offshorability index of  occupations, and Census division and time dummies. Models are weighted by start of  period 
commuting zone share of  national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A. ∆ Fraction of  Working Age Population in Manufacturing, Unemployment, NILF
B. ∆ Log Population, Log Wages, Annual Wage and Transfer Income
Employed in 
Manufacturing
Employed in Non-
Manufacturing Unemployed Not in Labor Force
∆ Log CZ Population 
(log pts)
∆ Avg Log Weekly 
Wage (log pts)
∆ Annual Wage/Salary 
Inc per Adult (US$)
∆ Transfers per Capita 
(US$)
Over the period 1990 to 2007—considered either as a single long difference or as stacked changes
for 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2007—CZs that were more exposed to increased import competition
from China experienced substantially larger reductions in manufacturing employment. Columns 1
to 4 of Table 4, based on Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), show that the decline in manufactur-
ing jobs was largely accommodated by an increasing share of a CZ’s working-age population that
was unemployed or out of the labor force. Specifically, a $1, 000 increase in a CZ’s per-worker im-
port exposure reduces the fraction of the working age population employed in manufacturing and
non-manufacturing, respectively, by −0.60 and −0.18 percentage points (the latter of which is not
significant), and raises the fraction unemployed and out of the labor force by 0.22 and 0.55 percent-
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age points.36 Autor, Dorn, Hanson (2013) further document that this finding holds for workers at
all education levels. For workers with less than a college education, increased trade exposure also
predicts significant reductions in CZ employment in non-manufacturing industries, suggesting the
presence of negative local demand spillovers.
Column 5 of Table 4 further shows that import competition has very modest effects on the size
of the working-age population in CZs. Tracing individual workers over time, Autor, Dorn, Hanson
and Song (2014) confirm that there is little geographic migration in response to the trade shock.37
Thus, the industry-level impacts of Chinese import competition seen in Table 3 are equally visible
within local labor markets. Contrary to the canonical understanding of U.S. labor markets as fluid
and flexible, trade-induced manufacturing declines in CZs are not, over the course of a decade, largely
offset by sectoral reallocation or labor mobility. Instead, overall CZ employment-to-population rates
fall at least one-for-one with the decline in manufacturing employment, and generally by slightly
more. These results run counter to a precept of general equilibrium trade theory that the local
employment effect of sectoral demand shocks should be short-lived, as the forces of wage and price
arbitrage and labor mobility dissipate these shocks nationally. In the limit, trade-induced shocks
to local manufacturing employment should affect the allocation of labor across sectors but should
have no measurable impact on employment rates in directly impacted CZs relative to the national
labor market. That this neoclassical prediction does not appear to hold even approximately over the
span of a decade suggests that the labor market impacts of trade shocks are likely to be amplified by
slow and incomplete adjustment: rather than modestly reducing wage levels among low-skill workers
nationally, these shocks catalyze significant falls in employment rates within trade-impacted local
labor markets.38
Regional labor-market consequences from exposure to trade with China have also been studied
for countries other than the U.S.. Analyses for Norway (Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes, 2015) and
for Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014), covering periods from the late 1990s to 2007, find
36The import per worker measure is a variant of equation (3) that uses data on local employment by industry
to proxy for the sales and expenditure variables φik and Ek. It can be interpreted as assigning national imports
by industry to CZs based on CZs’ shares in national industry employment, and normalizing the imports assigned
to a CZ by total CZ employment. A $1,000 increase in annual imports per worker during a decade corresponds
approximately to the difference in the trade exposure between CZs at the 75th vs. 25th percentile of import exposure
during 1990-2007.
37Population responses to local trade shocks are also limited in other countries. Analyses from Germany (Dauth,
Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014) and Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014) both find weak and statistically
insignificant population adjustments in local labor markets that are exposed to import competition from low-wage
counties.
38Labor market adjustment to import competition from China may be also be incomplete because the trade shock
continues to accumulate over time as imports from China grow. In the case of Brazil, however, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
(2015) also find little spatial mobility and regional convergence in the years following a one-time trade liberalization
shock.
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results that are consistent with the U.S. evidence. Regions that face greater import competition
experienced a differential decline in manufacturing employment. Lower manufacturing employment
was primarily compensated by higher unemployment in Norway, and by greater employment outside
of manufacturing in Spain. Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum (2014) find that in Germany, Chinese
import competition also had a negative impact on manufacturing employment in local labor markets.
In the German case, the impact of rising Chinese import competition between 1988 and 2008 was
compounded by an even more rapid growth of imports from Eastern Europe following the fall of the
iron curtain. Distinct from the U.S. case, German manufacturers sharply increased exports to these
lower-wage countries, resulting in a more modest trade deficit with China and a trade surplus with
Eastern Europe. The employment gains related to these export opportunities roughly offset the job
losses from import competition in the case of China, while actually raising German employment in
the case of trade with Eastern Europe.
Though this paper’s focus is on the consequences of increased import exposure to China, this
was not the only trade shock to affect local labor markets in the U.S. over the last two decades.
The North American Free Trade Agreement, enacted in 1994, stands out as a landmark change
in U.S. trade policy, which led to the elimination of tariffs on U.S. imports from Mexico for the
large majority of manufactured products.39 Similar to the analyses in Topalova (2010) for India
and Kovak (2013) for Brazil, McLaren and Hakobyan (2015) estimate the impact of NAFTA tariff
changes on wages in U.S. regions (defined as Consistent Public Use Microdata Areas) between
1990 and 2000. They allow workers to be affected by tariff reductions either directly through their
industry of employment—where industries varied both in the magnitude and the speed of the tariff
cuts—or indirectly through the specialization of their local labor market in NAFTA-exposed sectors.
Both direct and indirect channels of transmission are important for wage outcomes. Wage growth for
high-school dropouts employed in the industries that were initially the most protected, and therefore
subject to the largest tariff declines, was 17 percentage points lower than for comparable workers
employed in initially unprotected industries. And high-school dropouts employed in locations that
were initially the most specialized in industries vulnerable to NAFTA had a wage growth that
was 8 percentage points lower than for similarly educated workers in locations with few protected
industries. Surprisingly, the next most affected labor-market group is workers with some college
education. NAFTA wage impacts for high-school educated workers are comparatively modest and
for the college-educated are effectively zero.
39U.S. trade with Canada was liberalized earlier in 1989 through the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Trefler,
2004).
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4.3 National Impacts versus Regional Impacts
The localized impacts of import competition measure the relative effect of the China trade shock
on more versus less trade-exposed regional labor markets. Should we take these results to mean
that trade-impacted locations suffered employment declines in absolute terms, or simply that they
benefited less relative to trade-insulated locations? This distinction between relative and absolute
effects matters. The former encompasses the distributional effects of trade, whereas the latter bears
on the magnitude of the net gains from trade.
Using an expanded version of equation (4), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016)
assess whether the seemingly adverse industry and region-level impacts are offset by employment
responses elsewhere in the economy. Looking across U.S. manufacturing industries whose outputs
compete with Chinese import goods, they estimate that had import penetration from China not
grown after 1999, there would have been 560 thousand fewer manufacturing jobs lost through the
year 2011. Actual U.S. manufacturing employment declined by 5.8 million workers from 1999 to
2011, making the counterfactual job loss from direct import competition amount to 10 percent of
the realized job decline. As these results are based on the reduced-form specification of equation
(2), they may however not capture the full general equilibrium consequences of trade.
Negative shocks to one industry are transmitted to other industries via economic linkages between
sectors. One source of such linkages is buyer-supplier relationships (Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar
and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2012). Rising import competition in apparel and furniture—two sectors in which
China is strong—will cause these “downstream” industries to reduce purchases from the “upstream”
sectors that supply them with fabric, lumber, and textile and woodworking machinery. Because
buyers and suppliers often locate near one another, much of the impact of increased trade exposure
in downstream industries is likely to transmit to suppliers in the same regional or national market.
Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016) use U.S. input-output data to construct upstream
import exposure shocks for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Estimates from
this exercise indicate negative employment effects in industries that sell outputs to directly trade-
exposed industries, from which trade exposure propagates upstream in the supply chain.40 Applying
the direct plus the indirect input-output measure of exposure increases estimates of trade-induced job
losses for 1999 to 2011 to 985 thousand workers in manufacturing, and to 2.0 million workers in the
entire economy. Inter-industry linkages thus magnify the employment effects of trade shocks, almost
doubling the size of the impact within manufacturing and producing an equally large employment
40Pierce and Schott (2015) and Federico (2014) find qualitatively similar results for the U.S. and Italy, respectively.
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effect outside of manufacturing.41
Two additional sources of linkages between sectors operate through changes in aggregate de-
mand and the broader reallocation of labor. When manufacturing contracts, workers who have lost
their jobs or suffered declines in their earnings reduce their spending on goods and services. The
contraction in demand is multiplied throughout the economy, depressing consumption and invest-
ment. Helping offset these negative aggregate demand effects, workers who exit manufacturing may
take up jobs in the service sector or elsewhere in the economy, replacing some of the earnings lost
in trade-exposed industries. Because aggregate demand and reallocation effects work in opposing
directions, we can only detect their net impact on aggregate employment.
To adjudicate among these mechanisms, Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016) sup-
plement their analysis of U.S. industries with an analysis of U.S. commuting zones that adds an
input-output structure to Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). If the reallocation mechanism is opera-
tive, then when a local industry contracts as a result of Chinese competition, some other industry in
the same commuting zone should expand. Aggregate demand effects should also operate within local
labor markets, as shown by Mian and Sufi (2014) in the context of the recent U.S. housing bust. If
increased trade exposure lowers aggregate employment in a location, reduced earnings will decrease
spending on non-traded local goods and services, thus magnifying the local impact. Estimates of
the net impact of aggregate demand and reallocation effects imply that import growth from China
between 1999 and 2011 led to an employment reduction of 2.4 million workers. While the employ-
ment losses are concentrated in industries that are either directly exposed to import competition
or indirectly via input-output linkages, there is little evidence for substantial offsetting employment
gains in local industries that are not exposed to the trade shock. The estimated employment decline
is larger than the 2.0 million job loss estimate obtained for national industries, which only captures
direct and input-output effects. It may still not capture the full consequences of the China shock on
U.S. employment, however, as neither the analysis for commuting zones nor for national industries
fully incorporates all of the adjustment channels encompassed by the other. The national-industry
estimates exclude reallocation and aggregate demand effects, whereas the commuting-zone estimates
exclude the national component of these two effects, as well as non-local input-output linkages.
Are there positive employment effects from U.S. trade with China that the literature may be
missing? One mechanism may work through the supply of imported inputs. The expanded ability of
41While the employment impact of upstream import exposure in significantly negative, the impact of downstream
import exposure is estimated to be small and insignificant in aggregate. Point estimates suggest that manufacturing
industries may expand employment when their supplier industries become exposed to Chinese competition (consistent
with lower input prices), while employment outside manufacturing is negatively affected by shocks that propagate
downstream (e.g., reduced employment in a wholesale business that used to buy locally produced manufactures).
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U.S. firms to offshore production to China may raise productivity for workers in the U.S. (Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), lower the relative price of intermediates (Auer, Degen, and Fischer,
2013), or extend the range of final goods that firms are capable of producing (Goldberg, Khandelwal,
Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010). Granting that such benefits are plausible in theory, and have been
found in other national contexts, neither Pierce and Schott (2015) nor Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) detect evidence of positive U.S. industry or regional employment responses to increased
imported input supply. A second mechanism may be that increased competition in final goods
markets alters investments in innovation. Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2015) show that European
apparel and textile firms that faced greater competition from China following the elimination of
quotas under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement produced more patents, had higher productivity growth,
and boosted purchases of new technology. Although intensified product-market competition may
raise the incentive for innovation, it can just as easily work in the opposite direction. The aggregate
impact of Chinese competition on U.S. innovation remains unknown.42
The reduced-form analysis suggests that the reallocation of labor across U.S. industries and
regions in response to increased competition from China does not produce an offsetting increase in
employment by other U.S. traded-good industries, as the simple logic of neoclassical trade theory
would have predicted. Other indirect gains from trade with China are, in principle, still possible.
One explanation for the extremely modest offsetting employment increase in non-exposed sectors
in the U.S. may be related to the rapid contemporaneous rise in the U.S. aggregate trade deficit, a
substantial part of which reflects a growing trade imbalance with China. When faced with greater
import competition, an open economy normally reallocates resources out of some tradable industries
into others, at least under balanced trade. If, however, the trade shock is accompanied by a rise in
the trade deficit, then the reallocation from exposed tradables into tradables not exposed to China
may be delayed, shifting employment into non-tradables instead. While this reasoning still predicts a
long-run employment reallocation towards non-exposed tradables, the large and growing U.S. trade
deficit during the period under study may have significantly slowed such a reallocation.
42A further issue is that measured input-output linkages may miss some positive demand effects from U.S. exports.
Consider the iPhone, whose back panel states, “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China.” From its
U.S. headquarters, Apple offshores production to Foxconn, which employs 300,000 workers in its iPhone operations
in China. If productivity in Foxconn rises, iPhone sales may expand, thereby increasing demand for design services
among Apple’s 50,000 U.S. employees. However, not all of Apple’s design exports to China may appear in U.S. trade
data. For tax purposes, Apple may attribute some iPhone revenues to overseas subsidiaries. These revenues would
not appear in the U.S. current account until the earnings are repatriated, possibly far in the future. A similar logic
applies to U.S. business services that may expand as a result of increased trade with China.
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4.4 Wage and Transfer Impacts
Employment is not the only margin of labor market response to trade shocks. Column 6 of Table 4
shows that more trade-exposed CZs experience larger reductions in average weekly wages. Extending
the analysis in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) using quantile regression, Chetverikov, Larsen, and
Palmer (2015) document that these wage impacts of CZ-level trade exposure are concentrated among
workers in the bottom four wage deciles. The reduction in wages is not limited to manufacturing,
but indeed is concentrated outside that sector. While the shock to manufacturing industries seems
to affect local wages more broadly, the presence of differential wage impacts of trade across CZs
suggests that these labor markets are indeed local, as spatial mobility is not sufficiently large to
equilibrate wages at the national level.43
The estimates of Table 4 allow a simple calculation of the relative importance of employment and
wage adjustments for the overall decline in earnings in trade-exposed CZs. Given average annual
earnings of about $40,000 per worker, a reduction of employment by 0.78 percentage points (sum
of columns 1 and 2) per $1,000 dollars of imports per worker lowers earnings per adult by about
$312 per year (0.0078 × 40, 000). The same shock reduces the average weekly wage by 0.76 log
points among the approximately 70% of working-age adults who are employed, which implies an
additional earnings loss per adult of $213 per year (0.0076× 0.7× 40, 000). While trade theory has
typically emphasized the impact of trade shocks on wages, these results suggest that adjustments at
the employment margin might have an even larger quantitative impact on workers’ earnings.44
A direct consequence of reduced employment and wages in trade-exposed local labor markets is
an increase in transfer benefits. Perhaps unsurprisingly, more trade-exposed CZs see larger increases
in per capita payouts of Unemployment Insurance and Trade Adjustment Assistance (Figure 7,
based on Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013), both of which are designed to assist laid-off workers.
Yet, the impacts of trade shocks on transfer payments extend far beyond those tied to temporary
downturns. Because trade-induced declines in local employment and wages appear persistent, a
larger fraction of households in a CZ is likely to qualify for means-tested entitlements. As Figure 7
documents, more trade-exposed CZs experience larger per capita growth in publicly provided medical
43Local labor market analyses for other developed countries find significant wage declines in response to import
competition in Norway (Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes, 2015) and Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014), and an
insignificant wage reduction in Germany (Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014). In related work on a developing
economy, Costa, Garred and Pessoa (2014) analyze the Brazilian experience of trade with China during the period
2000 to 2010, which saw rising Brazilian exports of raw materials and growing imports of manufactured goods.
Whereas Brazilian regions specialized in raw materials experienced rising wages, those competing with imported
Chinese manufactures suffered wage losses, especially in low-skilled occupations.
44This finding has precedence in the literature on labor-market responses to trade. Using data on U.S. manufacturing
industries in the 1960s and 1970s, Grossman (1987) finds that adjustment to changes in import competition occurs
primarily in terms of industry employment and only secondarily in terms of wages.
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care, consistent with more households qualifying for income-based health benefits, and in government
income assistance, consistent with more households meeting the threshold for welfare payouts. Trade
exposure also contributes to an increase in disability benefits, whose take-up is typically associated
with permanent exit from the labor force (Autor and Duggan, 2003). Retirement benefits rise in
more trade-exposed CZs, suggesting that adverse labor-market shocks induce more workers to retire
earlier.45
Figure 7: Imports from China and Induced Government Transfer Receipts in Commuting Zones,
1990 - 2007
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What is striking about the impact of trade shocks on benefit take-up is not just the size of
these effects—for every extra $100 in local import exposure per worker transfer receipts rise by
approximately $6 per capita—but their relative magnitudes across categories. Trade Adjustment
Assistance, the primary federal government program intended to help workers who lose their jobs
as a result of foreign competition (Baicker and Rehavi, 2004), is effectively inconsequential in local
adjustment to trade shocks. Workers eligible for TAA receive extended unemployment benefits of
up to 18 months, as long as they remain enrolled in a training program, and may obtain allowances
toward relocation, job search, and healthcare.46 Trade-exposed CZs certainly experience sharp
45See Kondo (2013) for a general equilibrium analysis of the welfare consequences of trade-related employment losses
and Feler and Senses (2015) for results on the impact of the China trade shock on the provision of public services
across local jurisdictions.
46To qualify for TAA, workers must show that their employer cut back production because of import competition,
relocated production to a country with which the U.S. has a trade agreement, or lost business with a buyer or supplier
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relative growth in per-capita receipts of TAA benefits. However, while TAA reacts elastically to
trade exposure, it is far from the transfer category that responds most strongly in terms of dollar
expenditure; the total volume of TAA spending is negligible relative to many other transfer programs.
A more trade-exposed CZ (defined to be one at the 75th percentile of change in imports per worker
over 1991-2007) would see increased per capita take-up of TAA of only $0.23 when compared to a
less trade-exposed CZ (defined to be one at the 25th percentile of change in importers per worker),
while spending grows by more than $15 per capita for each of the three categories medical benefits,
federal income assistance, and Social Security retirement and disability benefits (Figure 7).
Despite the responsiveness of local transfer payments to local import exposure, on the whole
there appears to be limited regional redistribution of trade gains from winners to losers. Comparing
again the residents of CZs at the 75th and 25th percentile of import exposure, those in the more
exposed location experience a reduction in annual household wage and salary income per adult of
$549, while per capita transfer income rises by about $58, thereby offsetting just a small portion of
the earnings loss (Table 4, columns 7 and 8).47
4.5 Worker Level Impacts
The evidence above suggests that trade adjustment is a slow-moving process, and that its costs
fall heavily on trade-exposed local markets rather than being dispersed nationally. What these
analyses do not answer is to what degree costs are born specifically by workers employed at trade-
impacted firms rather than more broadly among comparably skilled workers in a locality. If within
industries and local labor markets, adverse trade effects are dispersed among workers of comparable
skills, the person-level costs of these shocks will be moderated. Alternatively, if, due to labor-
market frictions or skill-specificity, the impact falls disproportionately on workers directly employed
at import-competing establishments—and even more so on relatively low-skill workers within these
establishments—the adverse distributional consequences of trade exposure may be larger still.
Trade theory identifies a wide range of mechanisms through which trade shocks will have dif-
ferential effects across individuals. Heckscher-Ohlin reasoning suggests that the impacts of freer
trade on real incomes will vary according to an individual’s skill level. In a frictionless labor mar-
ket, rapid mobility of workers across firms, industries and regions guarantees that wages adjust
uniformly within skill groups in response to a trade shock, even if only a subset of industries or
that is TAA certified.
47Note, however, that household income is measured per adult (since only adults generate income), while transfer
income is measured per capita including children (since some transfers are based on the presence of children). A
household with children might thus offset somewhat more than 10 percent of its earnings loss.
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regions are directly exposed to trade. Under imperfect worker mobility across jobs, trade shocks can
have heterogeneous impacts within skill groups. Several recent models of labor-market adjustment
to trade incorporate switching costs for workers who desire to move across sectors. Structural esti-
mates of these models suggest that those costs may amount to several months or even several years
of a worker’s earnings (Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren, 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Pessoa, 2014;
Ashournia, 2015).48 Labor-market frictions may also stem from search costs for firms (Helpman,
Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010). These frictions tie worker outcomes to changes in foreign competition
in the initial firm, industry or region of employment. Until recently, there has been little evidence
on how individual workers adjust to trade shocks.49
Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014) examine the impact of import competition from China
on the careers of individual workers using longitudinal data from the U.S. Social Security Admin-
istration. Their analysis contrasts the labor-market outcomes of workers who were ex ante obser-
vationally similar except for their initial industry of employment.50 Workers whose 1991 industry
subsequently became exposed to higher import penetration accumulate substantially lower earnings
over the period of 1992 to 2007, compared to their peers with similar demographic characteristics
and previous labor-market outcomes. These workers also experience greater job churning. They
spend fewer years working for their initial firm, more years working outside their initial industry,
and more years receiving Social Security Disability Insurance. This trade-induced job mobility is
however not sufficient to equilibrate career earnings between more and less trade-exposed workers.
Why don’t employment transitions allow initially trade-exposed workers to fully recoup declines
in earnings with the initial employer? The literature on job loss provides one potential answer
(e.g., Neal 1995): displacement destroys industry-specific human capital, leaving affected workers in
positions for which they are poorly suited relative to non-displaced workers. A parallel explanation
is that workers’ specific skills cause them to seek positions in which they remain exposed to import
competition, notwithstanding the predilection of trade impacted workers to exit their original two
digit sector. Figure 8 provides insight into this latter mechanism by depicting the correlation between
workers’ trade exposure at their initial employers and at their current employers for each year between
1991 and 2007.51 In the years immediately following 1991, few workers have yet separated from their
48Allowing for switching costs across both industries and occupations, Artuc and McLaren (2015) also find sub-
stantial costs of occupational reallocation.
49Hummels, Jorgenson, Munch, and Xiang (2014) use data for Denmark to analyze the impacts of increased firm-
level imports on within-job spell earnings for workers.
50There may, of course, be unobserved factors that affect how workers sort themselves across industries. Sorting
based on unobservables would matter for the analysis if workers who were predisposed to lower lifetime earnings
growth disproportionately selected themselves into industries subject to future import competition from China.
51The correlations compare the 1991–2007 growth of import penetration between the industry that employed a
worker in 1991 and the industry that employed a worker in the subsequent year indicated on the x-axis. This
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original firms, and hence the correlation remains close to 1. Over time, the correlation between initial
and current firm trade exposure falls, as job transitions proceed apace, but remains strongly positive,
leveling off at 0.43 in the final year (2007). As a benchmark against which to evaluate the persistence
of trade exposure, the figure also plots counterfactual correlations in which trade exposure at any
new employer is set to zero, such that the reported series summarizes the cumulative likelihood of
having left the initial firm as of a given year. Logically, this counterfactual correlation also declines
over time, reflecting the rising likelihood of having departed from the original place of work. But the
counterfactual decline is far more rapid than the actual series and ends up at the much lower level of
0.17 in 2007. By implication, were trade-exposed workers to exit manufacturing immediately after
the first job separation, their net subsequent exposure would be 60 percent lower than in the actual
data. Thus, even after changing employers, initially trade-exposed workers appear likely to remain
in high-exposure industries, which are subject to further trade shocks.
Figure 8: Persistence of Trade Exposure since 1991
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1.2
Co
eff
ici
en
t
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Conditional correlation in trade exposure between 1991 firm and firm in indicated year
Counterfactual with zero trade exposure in all firms except 1991 firm
The graph plots regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals obtained from 2 × 16 regressions that relate the
1991–2007 trade exposure of a worker’s industry in the year indicated on the x-axis to the 1991–2007 trade exposure
of the worker’s initial 1991 industry. The counterfactual data series sets trade exposure to 0 for all firms except the
worker’s initial employer. It refers to a hypothetical scenario in which no worker joins a trade-exposed firm after
separating from their initial firm, and so all persistence in trade exposure is due to workers who have not separated
from their initial firm.
correlation is 1.0 in 1991 by construction.
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Although trade shocks disrupt the careers of both high-wage and low-wage individuals, there is
also substantial heterogeneity in patterns of adjustment. Workers whose pre-period wage falls in the
top earnings tercile of their birth cohort react to the trade exposure of their initial firm primarily
by relocating to firms outside the manufacturing sector. They do not experience an earnings loss
relative to their peers who started out in less trade-exposed industries. By contrast, workers in the
bottom tercile of pre-period earnings relocate primarily within the manufacturing sector, and often
remain in industries that are hit by subsequent increases in import competition. These low-wage
workers suffer large differential earnings losses, as they obtain lower earnings per year both while
working at the initial firm and after relocating to new employers.52 Labor-market adjustment to
trade further varies according to workers’ initial labor-force attachment. Among lower-attachment
workers (but not among higher-attachment workers), greater trade exposure results in fewer calendar
years in which their main income comes from earnings, and more calendar years where Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) is the main source of recorded income.
Patterns of worker-level adjustment to Chinese import competition have also been studied for a
number of European countries. Pessoa’s (2014) analysis for the United Kingdom shows that workers
whose initial industries became exposed to Chinese import competition accumulated significantly
lower earnings over the period 2000 to 2007. This earnings differential results both from fewer years
of employment, and from lower hourly earnings while employed. For the case of Denmark, Ashournia,
Munch and Nguyen (2014) similarly find a negative impact of the China shock on workers’ earnings
accumulation between 1997 and 2008, while Utar (2015) shows adverse earnings and employment
outcomes for workers whose industries were subject to the removal of MFA quotas. As in the
U.S., earnings losses are concentrated among low-skill workers.53 Both these reduced-form results
and structural estimates of models with sectoral switching costs suggest that workers in import
competing sectors bear differential adjustment costs in reaction to the China trade shock.
5 (Re)Assessing the Gains from Trade
China’s economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of individuals out of poverty. The resulting
positive impacts on the material well-being of Chinese citizens are abundantly evident. Beijing’s
52Conditional on similar initial annual earnings and other observable conditions of employment, men and women
experience similar consequences from an increase in exposure to import competition. Within manufacturing women
are disproportionately likely to hold low-wage jobs. Therefore, unconditional on other observables, women within the
sector are more adversely affected by the trade shock than are men.
53In other work, Donoso, Martin and Minondo (2015) study year-to-year labor market transitions in Spain over the
period 1997 to 2011, and find that import competition from China increases the likelihood that workers transition
from employment to unemployment, and from employment in manufacturing to employment outside that sector.
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seven ring roads, Shanghai’s sparkling skyline, and Guangzhou’s multitude of export factories—none
of which existed in 1980—are testimony to China’s success. What makes China so interesting
to economists, in part, is that the timing of this growth was dictated by forces internal to the
country and was therefore hard for outsiders to forecast. To maintain power, Mao was willing
to subject China to a state of near perpetual political and economic upheaval, beginning with the
collectivization of agriculture (1950-1953), continuing on to the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and
culminating in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). At each successive juncture, China fell further
behind the rest of the world economically. Its reversal of fortune under Deng began tenuously before
consolidating into the most rapid accumulation of wealth in human history.
If one had to project the impact of China’s momentous economic reform for the U.S. labor market
with nothing to go on other than a standard undergraduate international economics textbook, one
would predict large movements of workers between U.S. tradable industries (say, from apparel and
furniture to pharmaceuticals and jet aircraft), limited reallocation of jobs from tradables to non-
tradables, and no net impacts on U.S. aggregate employment. The reality of adjustment to the
China trade shock has been far different. Employment has certainly fallen in U.S. industries more
exposed to import competition. But so too has overall employment in the local labor markets in
which these industries were concentrated. Offsetting regional employment gains either in export-
oriented tradables or in non-tradables have been difficult to detect in the data. Input-output linkages
between sectors appear to have magnified rather than dampened the employment effects of trade
both within regions and nationally.
How should labor-market responses to trade with China change the way that economists think
about the gains from trade for the U.S. and other developed countries? One way is by recharac-
terizing the sets of individuals who are likely candidates for opposing distributional consequences
from economic integration. The literature is perhaps too comfortable with characterizing factor
markets in terms of just two national skill types, such that the essential margin of adjustment is the
relative wage of more- and less-skilled labor.54 Without question, a worker’s position in the wage
distribution is indicative of her exposure to import competition. In response to a given trade shock,
a lower-wage employee experiences larger proportionate reductions in annual and lifetime earnings,
a diminished ability to exit a job before an adverse shock hits, and a greater likelihood of exiting the
labor market, relative to her higher-wage coworker. Yet, the intensity of action along other margins
of adjustment means that we will misrepresent the welfare impacts of trade shocks unless we also
account for a worker’s local labor market, initial industry of employment, and starting employer.
54Analyses based on the specific-factors model (e.g., Kovak, 2013) are of course immune to this criticism.
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The importance of location for evaluating trade gains depends on how long it takes for regional
adjustment to occur. A presumption that U.S. labor markets are smoothly integrated across space
has long made regional equilibration the starting point for welfare analysis. The U.S. experience
of trade with China makes this starting point less compelling. Labor-market adjustment to trade
shocks is stunningly slow, with local labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and local
unemployment rates remaining elevated for a full decade or more after a shock commences. The
persistence of local decline perhaps explains the breadth of public transfer programs whose uptake
increases in regions subject to rising trade exposure. The mobility costs that rationalize slow adjust-
ment imply that short-run trade gains may be much smaller than long-run gains and that spatial
heterogeneity in the magnitudes of the net benefits may be much greater than previously thought.
Using a quantitative theoretical model, Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015) find that in the imme-
diate aftermath of a trade shock, constructed to mimic the effects of growth in U.S. imports from
China, U.S. net welfare gains are close to zero. The ultimate and sizable net gains are realized only
once workers are able to reallocate across regions in order to move from declining to expanding in-
dustries. Establishing the speed of regional labor-market adjustment to trade shocks should capture
considerably more attention from trade and labor economists.
In a modern gravity-type trade model, moving from autarky to freer trade expands the set of
product varieties to which consumers have access and thereby raises real income in inverse proportion
to the change in the share of spending a country devotes to domestically produced goods (Arko-
lakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013).55 Labor immobility amends this logic and gives local
comparative advantage a central role in the analysis of trade gains. If workers cannot move between
local labor markets easily or quickly and local patterns of comparative advantage are fixed—at least
temporarily—the national gains from trade will depend both on the standard gravity mechanism
of changing expenditure shares and on how easily workers within localities can resort into new in-
dustries. Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi (2015) demonstrate that in the limiting case where worker
resorting is infeasible—such that both regional and worker comparative advantages are locked in—a
trade shock of the magnitude of the China surge would yield geographic dispersion in welfare gains
whose standard deviation across regions equals twice the national mean. As the literature develops
a clearer picture of the permanence of local comparative advantage, economic models will be better
equipped to quantify the spatial dispersion in net benefits from trade within a country.
55Even in this seemingly benign setting, any individual country could lose from China’s rise. Although productivity
growth in China would necessarily raise welfare by expanding the product varieties to which a country has access,
it may also—depending on the sectors affected—depress national incomes by attenuating home-markets effects or
deteriorating the terms of trade (Hsieh and Ossa, 2015).
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The great China trade experiment may soon be over, if it is not already. The country is moving
beyond the period of catch-up associated with its market transition and becoming a middle-income
nation. Rapidly rising real wages indicate that the end of cheap labor in China is at hand (Li, Li,
Wu and Xiong, 2012). Its comparative advantage in the future will likely be less about its labor
abundance and random initial industry prowesses, and more about the endogenous responses of
business and government to the global economic environment. While the China of the future will
surely look very different than the China of the past, the exceptional nature of its progression from
Mao to Deng to today provides a rich vein for analysis that economists have far from exhausted.
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